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In May 2017, Xi Jinping welcomed the various heads of state and gov-ernment who had come to Beijing to express their support, or at leasttheir interest, in his massive global infrastructure project known as the
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Vladimir Putin, one of the guests at the forum,
gave his speech at the opening ceremony just after the President of the
PRC, which according to the Russian media, highlighted not only the im-
portance Beijing placed on the strategic partnership with Moscow but also
the Kremlin’s wish to strengthen its links with Beijing and increase bilateral
trade cooperation (Gostev 2017). Since then, Russia has demonstrated un-
reserved support for the BRI, a rather surprising turn of events since Moscow
had long been wary of the Chinese project, which encroached on its tradi-
tional zone of influence in Central Asia. 
This new stance towards China would seem to have been reconfirmed
during Xi Jinping’s official visit to Russia in July 2017, just before the G20
summit in Germany. On this occasion, Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin gave
details of the main areas of future Sino-Russian cooperation in the various
economic domains, whilst at the same time emphasising that they had a
common vision of international relations and a unified position on global
and regional questions. To crown this rapprochement initiative, at the end
of July, the Russian and Chinese navies, which since 2012 have been carrying
out annual joint military exercises in the Pacific, embarked upon joint naval
manoeuvres in the Baltic Sea, at the gates of the EU. (1)
The increased intensity of contacts between China and Russia has been
presented by the Russian media as a direct result of the diplomatic efforts
employed by Moscow since 2014, the aim of which is to redress the balance
of its foreign policy in favour of Asia, thereby ending its isolation in the
Western world, which came about as a result of the crisis in Ukraine and
the ensuing sanctions. (2) European and American media have interpreted
this as a sign that China and Russia are in the process of forming a sort of
strategic alliance that could harm American interests in the Asia-Pacific re-
gion and increase economic and geopolitical pressure on the EU. (3) For its
part, the official Chinese press is reserving judgement whilst at the same
time underlining the remarkable continuity of Sino-Russian rapprochement
since the end of the 1980s, a rapprochement that has accelerated since the
fall of the Soviet Union (4) In other words, by moving into a new stage of bi-
lateral relations, Beijing is merely following the general dynamic that has
characterised their development since the outset.
The evolution of Sino-Russian relations since the fall of the USSR has been
the subject of a great many academic studies that have examined it at the
global, regional, and bilateral levels. In Russia, researchers are above all
analysing the impact of the China-Russia partnership on the economic de-
velopment of the Russian Far East and pondering the political consequences
of an increased Chinese presence in the region (Savtchenko 2014; Portyakov
2013). The divergence of geopolitical interests in Central Asia is another im-
portant subject that has been attracting the attention of Russian specialists
in particular since the implementation of the BRI project in the region
(Gabuev 2016a). The recent acceleration in Sino-Russian rapprochement
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The Evolution of Sino-Russian
Relations as Seen from Moscow
The Limits of Strategic Rapprochement
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ABSTRACT: In the past few years, there has been a significant economic and political rapprochement between China and Russia, marked by the
announcement of numerous trade agreements and investments in transport infrastructure and the exploitation of Russian natural resources.
This cooperation seems to have intensified since the 2014 Ukrainian crisis. Some European and American media see it as a sign that China and
Russia are developing a form of strategic alliance that could harm Western interests. This article analyses the different forms of Sino-Russian
rapprochement whilst highlighting the economic and political limits of this cooperation.
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initiatives is viewed with ambivalence by most Russian sinologists, who fear
the gradual submission of Russian national interests to the economic and
political objectives of Beijing (Trenin 2015; Larin 2015; Gabuev 2016b). Chi-
nese analyses are often more optimistic. They emphasise the mutual eco-
nomic benefits that stronger bilateral relations have engendered and the
great potential of the strategic Sino-Russian partnership in the field of en-
ergy (Wang 2013). Lastly, Western studies concentrate more on the global
aspect of Sino-Russian rapprochement and try to evaluate its impact on
the balance of power within the international system (Wishnick 2017;
Røseth 2017; Colin 2007; Cabestan et al. 2008). The present article belongs
within this bibliographic framework and explores the various angles of ana-
lysis put forward by Russian, Chinese, and Western researchers, summarising
them and suggesting a nuanced interpretation of the new challenges raised
by Chinese-Russian relations in the Putin era.
For in fact Sino-Russian rapprochement is not a new phenomenon. Since
he came to power in 2000, Vladimir Putin has continually underlined Rus-
sia’s Eurasian character by affirming his wish to develop closer political re-
lations and greater economic cooperation with China and other Asian
countries. Nonetheless, until recently, with the exception of several major
projects in the field of energy, Sino-Russian cooperation did not progress
beyond declarations of intention and the signature of agreements in prin-
ciple. Taken overall, after the fall of the USSR and up until 2014, the main
objectives of Russian political policy scarcely evolved: Moscow was seeking
better integration for Russia in the international community and the de-
velopment of economic cooperation with the European Union, which re-
mains by far the main recipient of Russian hydrocarbon and its main trading
partner. At the same time, relations with China have developed slowly
though steadily, mainly driven by Beijing’s increasing energy and military
needs. The basis for this development was above all the sale of Russian hy-
drocarbon—of liquefied and crude gas, as well as other natural resources. 
The Ukrainian crisis of 2014, Western sanctions, and the rapid deteriora-
tion of relations with the United States pushed Moscow to accelerate its
geopolitical and economic move towards Asia. By injecting fresh energy
into the Asian vector of its foreign policy, the Kremlin would now seem to
be creating a real “pivot to the East” (povorot na Vostok), which may have
political consequences as varied as they are unpredictable. The strengthen-
ing of relations with China lies at the heart of the Russian pivot towards
Asia, even though the Kremlin, in its official statements, underlines the mul-
tidirectional nature of its new policy, which targets not only China but also
Japan, the two Koreas, India, and in the long term, the countries of South-
East Asia. 
Is this strategic redirection on the part of Russia simply a tactical “coup,”
a means of gaining greater influence in political and economic negotiations
with the EU and the United States, or is it a coherent strategy? What have
been the first results of this pivot towards China? The aim of this article is
to analyse the different aspects of the strategic partnership between China
and Russia, not only in order to evaluate their role in the current Sino-Rus-
sian rapprochement but also to identify structural imbalances that might
limit the scope of bilateral initiatives. Its subject matter concerns the de-
ployment of policies throughout the Asian and Arctic zone and the rivalry
and cooperation that these policies arouse. The research is positioned within
the framework of a geopolitical approach, the aim of which is to analyse
power struggles in certain zones or regions (Lacoste 1976; Lasserre et al.
2016), as well as an analysis of bilateral relations based on the speeches,
statements, and actions of the Chinese and Russian governments. 
The dangers of the trade imbalance 
Russia has a long history of contact with China, which was officially es-
tablished in the seventeenth century with the first Russian diplomatic mis-
sions to Beijing. In the 1860s, the two countries became next-door
neighbours when the territories of eastern Siberia, nowadays known as the
Russian Far East, became part of the Russian Empire. Since then, questions
of the demarcation of the Sino-Russian border, the joint exploitation of the
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Figure 1 – Development of trade between China and Russia, 1992-2017 (in billions of U.S. dollars)
Source: Andreïtchouk and Louzounov 2012; Russian Ministry of Economic Development 2015 and 2018.
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region’s natural resources, and the management of migrant flows from
China have been at the heart of disputes between the two countries. The
fall of the USSR and the gradual settling of border disputes in the 1990s
have normalised political relations between Russia and China and con-
tributed to the rapid development of Sino-Russian relations.
At first, it was in the border regions that the effects of increasing trade
were most clearly felt. In the 1990s, the population of the Russian Far East
was living in very difficult conditions. Most of the government aid programs
had been abolished, state companies unable to adapt to the radical eco-
nomic changes ceased to operate, and the kolkhozes—in the throes of re-
organisation—were no longer able to produce sufficient crops. Under such
circumstances, the clothing and food products provided by the PRC at com-
petitive prices by Chinese traders quickly found consumers in a local market
in disarray. The products were not of very high quality but were a means of
survival for a local population that had been hard hit by the successive eco-
nomic crises that characterised the era of Boris Yeltsin. Thus it was that Chi-
nese consumer goods became basic commodities for the majority of the
inhabitants of the Russian Far East.
To meet the needs of this suddenly available and booming market, several
duty-free zones, considered important windows for the PRC’s foreign trade,
appeared in the North-East of China, a region bordering Russia and corre-
sponding to the Chinese provinces of Heilongjiang, Liaoning, and Jilin. The
Chinese created production and trade centres aimed at the Russian market,
farms producing fruit and vegetables, warehouses and distribution centres,
and many light industry facilities. Little by little, a complex structure was
set up for the distribution of goods between the two countries, a funda-
mental element of transnational trade. The considerable increase in trade
between the two countries since the beginning of the 2000s reflects both
this development (see Figure 1) and the growing importance of China in in-
ternational trade. In the period up until 2015, Sino-Russian bilateral trade
steadily increased despite the economic crisis of 2008, the effects of which
proved temporary. In 2009, Sino-Russian trade fell by 31.7%, but the fol-
lowing year the volume of trade all but regained its pre-crisis level. However,
in 2015, bilateral trade was once again in free fall as a result of the global
economic downturn and the significant fall in energy prices. In 2017, Sino-
Russian trade relations nevertheless rebounded, driven by the sale of arms
and Russian military technologies and the intensification of exports of Rus-
sian oil and natural gas to their Chinese neighbour (Lukin 2018). 
From the point of view of trade, therefore, the Russia-China rapproche-
ment effort would seem to have borne fruit. Since 2001, the volume of
Sino-Russian trade has grown nine-fold, reaching US$95.3 billion in 2014,
a record figure. In 2017, China was Russia’s leading trade partner for the
eighth consecutive year, with a volume of trade reaching $84.07 billion, an
increase of 20.8 % compared to the previous year. (5) However, this positive
balance sheet masks several significant imbalances.
Until 2006, in fact, this growth in trade was mainly the result of the in-
crease in Russian exports to China, which had allowed Russia to maintain a
trade surplus in its relations with the PRC. Nonetheless, imports from China
rapidly increased, stimulated by the need for everyday consumer products
in the Russian Far East and Siberia. This explains how, taken overall, the trade
balance has remained in favour of the PRC since 2007 (see Figure 2).
At the same time, the trade structure has radically altered (see Figure 3).
In Russian exports to China raw materials such as oil, round timber, and
non-ferrous metals such as nickel, copper, and aluminium now predominate.
So although hydrocarbons represented only 15% of Russian exports to
China in 2002, by 2017 their share had risen to 66.2%. Therefore, the period
during which Moscow hoped to export Russian technology and industrial
equipment to China seems to have come to an end. Machines and industrial
equipment, which still represented 20% of Russian exports in 2002, no
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Figure 2 – Evolution of Russian exports to China and Chinese exports to Russia, 2000-2017 
(in billions of U.S. dollars)
Source: Andreïtchouk and Louzounov 2012; Russian Ministry of Economic Development 2015 and 2018.
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Russian exports
Chinese exports
longer even appear on the list of exported products in 2017. Fertilizer and
pulp have also almost disappeared from the list (1.11% and 0.25% respec-
tively), since China now produces them itself using, in part, raw materials
(wood and chemical components) imported at low prices from Russia. 
As for Chinese exports to Russia, these have also changed (see figure 4):
in 2002, shoes, clothes, and other everyday consumer products predomi-
nated (48.7%), whilst in 2017, industrial machines and equipment (44.5%)
prevailed. The percentage of clothes, shoes, furniture, toys, and other per-
sonal and domestic articles has fallen considerably (22.8 %), although in
the Russian Far East and Eastern Siberia they continue to dominate the local
markets. 
These developments have been accentuated by the fact that for China,
trade relations with Russia are far less important than those it maintains
with the West: in 2014, when the volume of Sino-Russian trade beat all
records by attaining US$95 billion, trade between China and the EU and
the United States represented respectively US$615 billion and US$555 bil-
lion (China Statistical Yearbook 2015). So as far as trade is concerned, Russia
can only claim to be a junior partner that needs China, and one that China
can fairly easily dispense with. To this scarcely reassuring observation for
Moscow may be added another, and it is one that the Kremlin has equal
difficulty accepting.
The complementarity between North-East
China and the Russian Far East 
Closer economic relations 
In the 2000s, as a result of the growth in trade between the Chinese and
Russian border areas, the geographical and economic interrelationship be-
tween the Russian Far East and North-East China became more marked.
The economic activities of the Chinese in Russia also became more diver-
sified: to retail trade was added construction, agriculture, and tourism as
well as the exploration of the region’s natural resources. At the same time,
in their search for fresh economic opportunities, Chinese entrepreneurs ven-
tured farther and farther into the west of the country, gradually extending
their trade networks to cover the whole of the former Soviet Union. The
growing interrelationship of the border regions is often highlighted with a
great deal of optimism by Chinese politicians and researchers, who consider
it to be a natural process of regional integration and a symbol of good re-
lations between the two countries (Gao 2008; Diao and Liu 2009; Li 2013). 
For the Russians, this is now often seen as a necessary evil by local eco-
nomic and political players who are increasingly turning towards partners
in East Asia for the means to develop (credit, investors for projects, tech-
nologies, workforce, etc.) since they see no other solution to the recurring
economic problems of the Russian Far East (Ivanov 2009). Geographically
and logistically isolated from the rest of Russia since the disappearance of
the USSR, the region has experienced a severe socio-economic depression
exacerbated by the massive migration of the local population towards the
European area of Russia; since the fall of the USSR, the population of the
Russian Far East has fallen by more than 1.8 million to only 6.2 million in-
habitants (Garousova 2014). By way of contrast, the population of neigh-
bouring North-East China rose to 1 million inhabitants in 2016 (China
Statistical Yearbook 2017). This marked demographic disparity between the
two border regions worries the inhabitants of the Russian Far East, who
often see the increasing power of their neighbour in terms of “yellow peril”
rhetoric (Jing 2009). In Moscow, the situation has also provoked ambiguous
reactions. Whilst keen to develop these vast areas and their resources, the
federal authorities nonetheless hesitate to give China free reign in this en-
terprise for fear of losing control of the economic development of the Rus-
sian Far East, or even, in the long-term, their sovereignty over the region.
Noticeable reticence on the part of Russia in joint
projects
In 2009, to stimulate the development of regional Sino-Russian relations,
Moscow and Beijing adopted a “Program of Collaboration between the regions
of the Russian Far East and Eastern Siberia and the North-East of the PRC,”
which gave details of 160 joint projects to be implemented by 2018, 94 of
which were to be on Russian soil. Although remaining highly ambitious on
paper, this collaboration program did not manage to produce significant eco-
nomic results as a result of back-pedalling by the Kremlin, which did not wish
to confirm its intentions by releasing the financial and institutional support
needed for the realisation of the planned initiatives. Consequently, at the pre-
sent time, only 22 of these are under construction whilst the others have been
suspended or abandoned for various reasons (Latkin and Xiang 2015). 
The history of the construction of the cross-border Tongjiang-Nizhne-
leninskoye railway bridge illustrates this rather paradoxical situation. The
bridge would have considerably reduced the cost and transport time of trav-
elling between the town of Khabarovsk and the province of Heilongjiang.
Although the agreement in principle on its construction was signed in 2008,
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Figure 3 – Structure of Russian exports to China in 2002 and 2017 (in %)
Source: Renmin Ribao 2003; Russian Ministry of Economic Development 2018
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it was only in 2013 that all the practical details concerning the bridge’s con-
struction were finally elucidated. Under the terms of the bilateral agree-
ment, each country was to take responsibility for building its own section
of the bridge up to the border. The largest section of the bridge (1,755 me-
tres) was on Chinese soil and was finished in February 2014, whilst the Rus-
sians have still not managed to build their 310-metre section due to a lack
of finance and enthusiasm on the part of the local Russian companies as-
sociated with the project. Work finally began in 2017 following complaints
from the Chinese partners that led to direct intervention by Vladimir Putin
in the management of the project. (6)
It is partly in response to these concerns that for several years now
Moscow has been making a considerable effort to support the development
of the Russian Far East more closely by creating a specific Minister for the
Far East and by deciding to modernise the railway line linking the region of
Irkutsk to the Pacific coast (7) In order to underline the geopolitical impor-
tance of the region for the future of the country, Vladimir Putin ordered the
construction in the Amur region of a new spaceport, Vostotchny, which in
the long term should reduce Russia’s dependence on the Baikonur cosmod-
rome situated in Kazakhstan. (8) But at the same time, the federal authorities
do not possess sufficient financial resources to carry out most of the major
projects planned, and one of the new Minister’s objectives is to attract for-
eign investment from Asia. So whilst Moscow wishes to strengthen its eco-
nomic and geopolitical hold on the Russian Far East, it is incapable of doing
so without the participation of Asian players, mainly Chinese, in the mod-
ernisation of these regions. 
The fall of oil prices that hit Russia’s currency revenues hard, and above
all the Ukrainian crisis and resulting Western sanctions, exacerbated this
paradoxical situation. Moscow had to abandon its cautious approach to Bei-
jing and its growing influence in the East of the country in the hope of im-
proving Russia’s economic prospects, which seemed catastrophic as a result
of the fall in oil prices and the implementation of Western sanctions. The
idea that China could advantageously replace the West as an economic
partner and as a source of technologies and cutting-edge techniques has
become a mantra in the Kremlin, propagated by all the Russian media and
actively promoted within the government. (9)
The mirage of major Sino-Russian projects
Russia’s current pivot towards China would seem to be based above all
on the realisation of major bilateral projects, mainly in the fields of energy
and military and spatial technologies. This is not a new trend —energy has
lain at the heart of Sino-Russian relations since the fall of the USSR. In 1996,
during the official visit of Boris Yeltsin to Beijing, the two countries signed
the first agreement on the development of energy cooperation that enabled
the first projects in this domain to be realised several years later. From the
very beginning of his first mandate, Vladimir Putin has emphasised his wish
to develop an energy network in Eastern Siberia and in the Far East towards
the Pacific and China, which was officially confirmed in the document en-
titled Russia’s Energy Strategy until 2020, published in 2003, and again in
the version published in 2009. According to this document, in 2030, Asia
(China and Japan mostly) will be receiving 25% of the oil and 20% of the
gas produced annually in Russia (Baïkov 2010). However, the realisation of
these ambitions was delayed for years. Exploiting the resources in Siberia
and the Russian Far East meant first building the underlying infrastructures
and obtaining access to new technologies and oil well structures that were
mainly in the possession of Western companies, and this required consid-
erable investment. Moreover, Moscow did not wish China to become the
sole buyer of Russian oil and gas in the region in order to avoid Russian in-
dustry becoming dependent on the Chinese energy market. Japan and South
Korea were therefore also invited to participate in these projects, which
complicated negotiations with Beijing and further delayed the realisation
of the objectives announced in Russia’s Energy Strategy.
As a result, it was not until 2011 that Russia began exporting crude oil to
China on a massive scale. The construction of oil pipelines on Russian soil
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Figure 4 – Structure of Chinese imports to Russia in 2002 and in 2017 (in %)
Source: Renmin Ribao 2003; Russian Ministry of Economic Development 2018
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was financed partly by Beijing, allowing it to secure its hold on Siberian hy-
drocarbon stocks for years to come at a competitive price. (10) With the ex-
plosion of the Ukrainian crisis, which amongst other problems created
tension over transport and future imports of Russian gas to Europe, the
Asian market, with its potential for growth, became a particular centre of
attention for a Kremlin searching for alternatives to its trade relations with
the West.
Indeed, since 2014, Moscow has signed multiple new industrial coopera-
tion agreements with Beijing, including a gigantic gas contract worth
US$400 billion for the annual delivery of 38 billion cubic metres of Russian
gas to China until 2048. This “mega-contract,” often cited by various media
as the symbol of the new Sino-Russian rapprochement, is nonetheless the
result of ten years of efforts and tough negotiations on the price of the gas
and financing of the construction of the pipelines. Signed against a back-
ground of international tensions, this gas agreement and its accompanying
conditions have still not been made public, and according to many special-
ists, in order for it to be signed so quickly, Moscow must have had to bow
to Chinese demands on price (Lukin 2018). Although this has admittedly
allowed the Kremlin to show its Western partners that Russia is far from
isolated on the international stage, it has come at the cost of economic
concessions to China. 
The political rapprochement boasted by Moscow has therefore not made
China more conciliatory in economic matters. On the contrary, China has
taken advantage of the opportunity to increase its demands concerning
price and access to the Russian market. Russian businessmen who thought
Chinese banks could provide capital, thereby compensating for the negative
effects of Western sanctions, were quickly disappointed by the lack of en-
thusiasm on the part of their Chinese counterparts, who imposed conditions
that were difficult for them to accept. 
Sino-Russian collaboration in the BRI project 
A project that arouses a measure of distrust in
Russia
The will of the government plays a fundamental role in the strengthening
of the Sino-Russian strategic project: it stimulates the development of major
projects but also renders the mechanisms of their implementation heavy
and ineffectual. In certain cases the economic benefits of these projects are
only possible in the very long-term after a number of conditions, some
geopolitical, have been met. The participation of Russia in the BRI project is
a perfect illustration of this. Described by Beijing as “beneficial for all”
(gongying 共赢), this large-scale international cooperation program should
above all sustain the growth rates of the Chinese economy, which for several
years now has been experiencing an increasingly marked deceleration,
thereby threatening the country’s domestic stability. It should also allow
China to move on to a new stage in its economic development and achieve
the main strategic objectives determined by Xi Jinping and his team: creat-
ing a “moderately prosperous society” by 2020 and turning China into a
modernised, rich, and powerful socialist state by 2049 (Zhao 2016). 
The Chinese initiative that began by mainly targeting the development of
infrastructure in Central Asia has been greeted with a great deal of suspicion
by Moscow, which sees it as a threat to its economic and geopolitical in-
terests. Since the disappearance of the USSR, the development of very close
trade links between China and the countries of Central Asia has proceeded
in parallel with the gradual erosion of Russian influence in the region. Since
2013, China has been the main trading partner of Kyrgyzstan (47.6% of the
country’s national trade), Tajikistan (26.9%), Turkmenistan (42.7%), and
Uzbekistan (20.6%) (Larin 2015). Beijing grants them advantageous credit
terms and invests in a variety of industrial projects. Russia cannot compete
with the Chinese offer and seems to be gradually and inevitably losing its
influence within Eurasia despite the launching of several regional integration
initiatives such as the Customs Union and the Eurasian Economic Union
(EEU). The principle objective of these initiatives on the part of Moscow
was to ensure the free movement of goods, people, and capital between
the member countries and to promote the idea of a natural interdepen-
dence that would facilitate economic integration between Russia and the
countries of Central Asia. The BRI initiative, which targets similar objectives,
was therefore not seen by Moscow as an economic opportunity but rather
as a challenge. The Ukrainian crisis, followed by Western sanctions against
Moscow, forced the Kremlin to review its position and envisage closer Sino-
Russian collaboration in the BRI project.
In Central Asia, after long negotiations, Moscow and Beijing seem to have
once again found grounds for agreement and are coordinating their efforts
by combining the Chinese BRI with the Russia’s EEU initiative. This new con-
figuration should attenuate Sino-Russian rivalry in Central Asia by allowing
all the players to benefit. At the present time, this “connection” (sopriajenie
in Russian and duijie 对接 in Chinese) remains a vague concept because of
differences in vision on the one hand, and existing problems of communica-
tion between Beijing and Moscow on the other. For example, the Russians
would like China to recognise the EEU as a vital partner in its negotiations
with the countries of Central Asia, whilst the Chinese consider the EEU as
the extension of their own initiative, the principle role of which is to promote
the objectives of the BRI (Gabuev 2016a). The real modalities of this Sino-
Russian collaboration in Central Asia have therefore not yet been clarified. 
Trade prospects still fairly limited 
Therefore, for the time being, Russian participation in the BRI seems to
be limited to the use of the North-East Passage in the Arctic and of the
Trans-Siberian railway to transport Chinese products to Europe and raw ma-
terials to China, a long-standing market diversification project for this rail
track (Helle 1977) that Moscow agreed to see integrated into the BRI along
with the development of the Arctic roads. The growth of commercial traffic
on the Trans-Siberian could, in principle, create considerable profits, but it
is dependent on the modernisation of the rail track. In its current state, the
Trans-Siberian has already attained its maximum transit capacity, leading
to many bottle-necks and slowing down its operations. Its renovation re-
quires billions of dollars of investment that Beijing has not promised
Moscow. Indeed, it is vital not only to renew the existing technical equip-
ment but also to increase the speed of processing the trains and the size of
the station platforms.
Moreover, the cost of transporting Chinese goods via the Trans-Siberian
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varies considerably depending on the route taken: the transportation of a
standard 20ft container (1 TEU) via the eastern section of the Trans-Siberian
from Shanghai to Brest costs US$2,200, while transporting the same con-
tainer over the Western section of the Trans-Siberian via Kazakhstan on the
Urumqi-Omsk-Moscow-EU route would come to around US$1,300
(Makarov and Sokolova 2016). But in any case, sending a container by sea
has proved cheaper than sending it overland: in 2016, the average cost of
transporting a container from Shanghai to Europe was US$932. 
Moreover, cargo ships are capable of moving more than 10,000 containers
at once, and trains no more than 500. It is therefore difficult to imagine
that in the near future land routes can compete with maritime routes in
the PRC’s international trade. Despite the grand official declarations on the
benefits modernisation of the Trans-Siberian can bring to Russia and China,
Beijing nevertheless does not wish to invest in this project of uncertain prof-
itability, whilst Moscow does not possess the necessary funds to carry it
through. However, considerable sums have already been invested in China
for the modernisation of the Chinese network up to Kazakhstan via the rail-
way stations of Alashankou and Khorgos (Huang and Lasserre 2017; Huang
et al. 2018). In order to both support the modernisation of the domestic
network and diversify the possibilities of trade links with the interior of the
country and the European markets, China seems to be supporting the de-
velopment of these rail links as well as those between China and Laos and
China and Iran, as part of the BRI. Traffic remains limited (a little more than
1% of Chinese exports; around 40,000 containers for just above 1% of Chi-
nese exports; around 40,000 containers for the China-Germany links) but
has experienced strong growth, especially on the Alashankou-Kazakhstan
route, the Western segment of the Trans-Siberian (Lasserre et al. 2017). It
was also as part of the plan to modernise links that an agreement in prin-
ciple on the building of a Moscow-Beijing high-speed rail line was signed in
2014, and a complementary agreement concerning the beginning of works
on the Moscow-Kazan section was signed in 2015. Nonetheless, the reali-
sation of these two projects would seem to have been frozen, since the con-
ditions imposed by the Chinese make them profitable for Russia only if the
exploitation of its new rail lines immediately creates a considerable profit,
which is not guaranteed. (11)
Chinese interest in the Russian Arctic and its resources is not new, even if
at the present time, with the exception of the mega-project for the pro-
duction of liquefied natural gas at Yamal, few collaborative Sino-Russian
projects have been set up in this region. Chinese participation (12) in the con-
struction of this gigantic gas liquefaction factory and associated infrastruc-
tures to the north of the Arctic Circle has been presented by Beijing as a
great success that demonstrates China’s capacity to meet major technical
and financial challenges and justifies China’s increasing interest in the Arctic
and the exploitation of its resources (Sørensen and Klimenko 2017).
The official inclusion of the North-East Passage in the BRI’s maritime
network, announced officially in 2017, could in effect stimulate Sino-Rus-
sian cooperation in the field of energy and transport as well as extending
Chinese involvement in joint projects. Indeed, China wishes to participate,
not only as a silent investor but also as a supplier of equipment and tech-
nology, in the exploitation of the Russian Arctic’s natural resources and
in the construction of new infrastructures on Russian soil that would en-
able commercial traffic via the North-East Passage. Russia seems ready
to take this step, in its official statements at least, and to give Chinese
companies more economic opportunities in Russia within the framework
of the BRI. 
Temporary rapprochement or durable
strategy?
The rapprochement between Beijing and Moscow has been influenced by
a great many factors at both the international and domestic levels. These
fluctuate widely and are likely to evolve very quickly. Conscious of the grad-
ual shifting of economic balances and international policies towards Asia,
in particular China, Russia is seeking to take advantage of the rapproche-
ment with China to improve its own economic prospects. The rapid deteri-
oration of its relations with the EU and the United States has led Russia to
rely more on its Chinese neighbour, which unlike Japan and South Korea,
two other targets of its “pivot to the East,” has not joined in Western sanc-
tions. Beijing’s support has nonetheless come at the price of major eco-
nomic concessions that Russia was not necessarily ready to agree to. 
The story of the sale of 10% of the shares in the Russian oil company Vanko-
rneft to the CNPC (China National Petroleum Corporation) is a good example
of this complex situation. Vankorneft, a subsidiary of the giant Russian oil
company Rosneft, is the main operator of the huge gas and oil field in Vankor
in the north of Eastern Siberia in Russia, whose oil reserves of 361 million
tons and gas reserves of 138 billion cubic metres make it a site of national
strategic importance (Overland and Kubayeva 2017). The Agreement in Prin-
ciple concerning the sale of shares in Vankorneft to China was signed in
November 2014, in the middle of the Ukrainian crisis. However, after two
years of negotiations, the contract was cancelled, since Russia and China were
not able to come to an agreement on the conditions of sale. The price offered
by the CNPC was considered too low by Rosneft, and neither of the two part-
ners would agree to lower their requirements. To the disagreement over price
was added the Chinese demand to have more places on the Vankorneft board
and to participate in drilling activities. This demand was considered unaccept-
able by Rosneft, which wanted to retain total control over the management
of the oil deposits and expected the CNPC to be nothing more than a silent
partner. Finally, Rosneft sold 38.8% of the Vankorneft shares to Indian com-
panies —Oil India, Indian Oil, Bharat Petro Resources, and ONGC Videsh—
which proved rather more accommodating than the CNPC (Nikolaev 2017). 
So despite a fairly complacent official attitude, Beijing did not wish to
sacrifice its national economic interests on the altar of “Sino-Russian friend-
ship” as Moscow had hoped and has made no concessions during negotia-
tions on the price of the contracts and the conditions of their realisation.
Refusing to take on the role of junior partner in bilateral relations increas-
ingly dominated by China, Moscow immediately tried to backtrack in its
proposals for economic cooperation. Moreover, this oil contract is not the
only Sino-Russian project of strategic importance to be reconsidered by
Moscow or by Beijing: out of 21 major Sino-Russian agreements (contracts
with an estimated value of more than a billion dollars) on the realisation of
various joint projects in the Russian Arctic signed between 2012 and 2017,
only 10 have been implemented in practice whilst the others have been
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abandoned or frozen (Rosen and Thuringer 2017). It would therefore seem
that a marked difference exists in the economic interests and objectives of
China and Russia. It would seem difficult to reconcile these differences with
the accelerated move toward rapprochement with China announced with
great pomp in Moscow but only cautiously supported by Beijing. In addition
to the presumed political consensus between the two countries, the en-
couragement of bilateral economic interactions remains a prisoner of the
absence of steady growth in the Russian economy, and of the mutual dis-
trust that hinders any real cooperation. 
Conclusion
The strengthening of relations with China is at the heart of Russia’s recent
pivot towards Asia. This is not surprising in view of the importance that the
Kremlin has attached to the Chinese dimension of its foreign policy since
the fall of the USSR. By presenting themselves as champions of multipolar-
ity, Moscow and Beijing hope to contest the established order under the di-
rection of Washington and aspire to create a new system of collective
security in the Asia Pacific region. Finally, China and Russia cooperate reg-
ularly within the framework of major regional organisations such as BRICS
and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. However, despite the very
many points of convergence between the two countries, the ambitions and
geography of Russian and Chinese interests are far from identical. On the
contrary, in very many cases they find themselves in opposite corners (ri-
valry over their influence in Central Asia, and differences concerning the re-
alisation of joint projects, to name just two examples). 
The recent rapprochement of Moscow with the Asia-Pacific region at a
time when Russia is experiencing a severe crisis in its relations with the
western world concerns those who see it as an attempt to build a sort of
anti-American axis. Presented by the Kremlin as a long-term strategy that
aims to restore the balance of Russian external policy, this turn towards
Asia is hindered by the major divergence of interests between Moscow
and Beijing, its main partner in Asia, as well as by Russia’s economic weak-
ness, which makes it difficult to finish existing projects or to suggest con-
tracts likely to interest Chinese players. Nevertheless, although at first the
efforts of the Kremlin to encourage links with China often had the ap-
pearance of an emotional reaction to the growing chill in relations be-
tween Russia and the West, the situation now seems more complex.
Russia’s membership in the BRI project and the official inclusion of the
Russian Arctic in this Chinese initiative bear witness to the desire of
Moscow and Beijing to take their economic and political cooperation to
a higher level (Ferdinand 2016; Sangar 2017). In the long-term, prospects
for Russia’s pivot towards China will depend on the international situation
and the capacity of the Kremlin to elaborate a coherent strategy for rap-
prochement with China, with clearly defined objectives that are applied
on the ground.
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